We introduce a new family of cooperative games for which there is coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value. These socalled clique games are such that players are divided into cliques, with the value created by a coalition linearly increasing with the number of agents belonging to the same clique. Agents can belong to multiple cliques, but for a pair of cliques, at most a single agent belong to their intersection. Finally, if two players do not belong to the same clique, there is at most one way to link the two players through a chain of players, with any two adjacent players in the chain belonging to a common clique.
1 Introduction similar, but looks at cycles instead of paths, yielding a cycle-complete mcst problem and the cycle-complete solution.
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2007b) also provide another Shapley valuebased definition of the folk solution, by defining a cost game assuming that any coalition can connect either to the source or to any other node.
We identify mcst problems that generate clique games. In particular, it turns out that if we consider elementary mcst problems (in which all edges have a cost of 0 or 1), which form a basis for all mcst problems, the subset of cycle-complete problems (which include irreducible problems) generates clique games. Our result on clique games then applies, yielding that the nucleolus coincides with the cycle-complete solution for cycle-complete problems and with the folk solution for irreducible problems.
We can extend the correspondence one step further: for all elementary mcst problems, the folk (cycle-complete) solution corresponds to the nucleolus and the permutation-weighted average of the extreme points of the core of the public (private) mcst game.
The paper is divided as follows: preliminary definitions are in Section 2. Section 3 describes and illustrates clique games. Section 4 contains the correspondence results. The application and extension of the results to mcst problems are described in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a set of agents. A transferable utility game (TU game, for short) is a pair (N, v) where v is a real-valued function defined on all subsets S ⊆ N satisfying v(∅) = 0. Given i ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ {i}, the marginal contribution of agent i to S is defined as A value is a function that associates with each TU game (N, v) a payoff allocation x ∈ R N . Two well-known values for TU games are the Shapley 4 value (Shapley, 1953) and the (pre)nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) . The Shapley value of the game (N, v) is the payoff allocation Sh(v) defined as
for all i ∈ N , where Π is the set of all orderings of N and P i (π) is the set of predecessors of agent i in π, i.e. P i (π) = {j : π(j) < π(i)}.
The excess of a coalition S in a TU game (N, v) with respect to an allocation x is defined as e(S, x, v) = i∈N x i − v(S). The vector θ(x) is constructed by rearranging the 2 n excesses in (weakly) increasing order. If
The nucleolus of the game (N, v) is the set v({i}) ∀i ∈ N is the set of individually rational allocations. When X = ∅, as it is the case for the TU games we study here, it is well-known that N u(v) is a singleton, whose unique element we denote, with some abuse of notation, also as N u(v). By contrast, the prenucleolus of the game (N, v) is the set
is the set of allocations. Whenever the prenucleolus is individually rational, which will be the case in all games that we consider, it coincides with the nucleolus. Therefore, from now on, we focus exclusively on the nucleolus. The core is the set of allocations such that no coalition is assigned less than its stand-alone value. Formally,
When Core(v) = ∅, for each π ∈ Π, let y π ∈ Core(v) be the allocation that lexicographically maximizes the allocations with respect to the order given by the permutation. The permutation-weighted average of extreme points of the core is the average of these allocations:
If the game is convex,ȳ is the Shapley value. It is also closely related to the selective value (Vidal-Puga, 2004 ) and the Alexia value (Tijs, 2005) , the permutation-weighted average of leximals. All of these values coincide for the minimum cost spanning tree problem studied in Section 5.
On some occasions, we work with transferable cost games (N, C), where C is a real-valued function defined on all subsets S ⊆ N satisfying C(∅) = 0. We then define v C as follows:
An allocation x for the cost game C is equivalent to an allocation
Finally, we say that C is concave iff −C is convex. It is straightforward to check that C is concave iff v C is convex.
Clique games
We say that there exists a path between Q k and Q l if there exists
Analogously, we say that there exists a path between Q k and Q l through agent i if there exists
We say then that P kl i is a path between Q k and Q l through agent i. The set of agents connected to Q k via a path through agent i ∈ Q k 6 is denoted as In this case, P We say that a game N, v Q is a clique game if there exist
there is at most one path between any two elements of Q),
with Q(S) = {Q ∈ Q : S ∩ Q = ∅}.
We write Q(i) for Q ({i}). Let C be the set of all clique games. We conclude this section by proposing two examples of clique games.
Example 2 (Trading goods) Suppose that N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, with 1 and 2 being producers and 3, 4 and 5 being buyers. Producer 1 has a capacity to produce two units at constant marginal cost c 1 while producer 2 can produce a single unit at cost c 2 . Each buyer i is interested by a single unit that she values at R i . We suppose that the reserve prices of the buyers are larger than the marginal cost of the producers. We further suppose that producers 1 and 2 have exclusive territories (because of vertical restraints or collusion) and that buyers 3 and 4 are on the territory of producer 1 and buyer 5 on the territory of producer 2. We also suppose that the producers' unused capacity can be sold to external buyers at price q and that buyers have the option of buying from an external supplier at price p, with R i > p > q > c j .
When a coalition forms, trades occur between buyers and sellers in the same territory, with unsatisfied demands and unsold supply resolved on the outside market. For example, coalition {1, 2, 3, 5} will organize trades between 1 and 3 and 2 and 5, generating a surplus of R 3 + R 5 − c 1 − c 2 . In addition, producer 1 sells its extra unit on the outside market, generating an additional surplus of q − c 1 .
The game can thus be represented (see Figure 2 ) by a clique game, with cover Q = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 5}} and Example 3 (Job scheduling problem (Bahel and Trudeau, 2017) ) Suppose that N = {1, 2, 3, 4} with each agent having jobs to schedule on a machine. Each job has fixed starting and finishing times, and a machine can only process one job at time. Each agent i has utility u i per job completed, and machines can only be rented for the full time interval at cost c. Since u i > c, a coalition will generate the most surplus by hiring the minimal number of machines needed to schedule all jobs of its members. Not all job scheduling problems can be represented as a clique game however. If the two jobs of agent 1 are coming from different agents, we lose the representability by a clique.
Correspondence between the Shapley value and the nucleolus
In this section we show that for clique games, the Shapley value and the nucleolus coincide, and we provide a closed-form expression for their value. To get to this result, we first describe the marginal contributions in clique games.
Lemma 1 Given a clique game (N, v Q ), the marginal contribution of player
Proof. By definition of a marginal contribution,
We are now ready for the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 For all v Q ∈ C and all i ∈ N ,
Proof. It is obvious from Lemma 1 that v Q is a convex game. Thus, the Shapley value is the average of extreme points of the core (Shapley, 1971; Ichiishi, 1981) and Sh v Q =ȳ v Q . We show that for all i ∈ N ,
We suppose that for all k ∈ {1, ..., K},
is, there is a (unique) path between any two elements of Q. Without that assumption, we can partition our agents into groups unconnected by paths, and we can compute the Shapley value and the nucleolus independently on each element of the partition. We start with Sh v Q . Given π ∈ Π, under Lemma 1, the marginal contribution of agent i to
. Summing up, we obtain the desired result.
We now focus on N u v Q . Let x ∈ R N defined as
Assume without loss of generality
. By construction, this is the lowest excess value. To see why, notice that any S ⊂ N must have at least one Q ∈ Q (S) such that |Q ∩ S| < |Q|. That generates an excess of
. This is a partition of N . To see why, notice that each T 1 i is nonemtpy (because i ∈ T 1 i for all i ∈ Q i ), their union is N (because all cliques are connected through a path), and they are pairwise disjoint (because of assumption i)). Thus, we have |Q 1 | coalitions whose complements have the minimal excess, with each agent belonging to exactly one of of these coalitions. Therefore, to increase the excess of one of these coalitions we would need to decrease the excess of another coalition, and the corresponding allocation could not be the nucleolus. We repeat the process for all Q k to obtain that
for all Q k ∈ Q and all i ∈ Q k . In case i ∈ Int(Q k ) for some Q k ∈ Q, we have In case Q = {Q 1 }, we have N = Int (Q 1 ) and hence N u v Q = x. So, we assume |Q| > 1. From condition i) in the definition of clique games, there exist some i ∈ N and
Under (2) and the efficiency of x, we deduce N u i v Q = x i . Repeating the same reasoning, we can always find a new i ∈ N and Q k ∈ Q(i) such that (2) and the efficiency of x imply N u i v Q = x i , and so on until we get N u v Q = x.
We next establish the connection between clique games and the PS-games of Kar et al. (2009) . We say that a game (N, v) is a PS-game if there exists
We show the condition needed for a clique game to also be a PS-game, which illustrates that not all clique games are PS-games.
Proposition 1 A clique game v
Q is a PS-game if and only if for all Q ∈ Q it holds either |Q| ≤ 2 or v Q = 0.
Proof. Under Lemma 1, for any clique game v Q , we have that
and thus that ∆
Hence, v Q is a PS-game if and only there exists b ∈ R N such that
If |Q| ≤ 2 then |Q ∩ S| ≤ 1 (because i ∈ Q and i / ∈ S). Since Q ∈ Q(S), we deduce Q ∩ S = {j} for some j = i. Thus, Q = {i, j} ⊆ S ∪ {i}, which contradicts that Q ∈ Q (N \ (S ∪ {i})). Hence, Q(S) ∩ Q (N \ (S ∪ i)) ∩ Q(i) ⊆ {Q ∈ Q : |Q| > 2}.
From this, we deduce that if v Q = 0 for all Q ∈ Q such that |Q| > 2, then b i = 0 for all i ∈ N .
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Suppose now that there exists Q ∈ Q such that |Q| > 2 and v Q > 0. Fix i ∈ Q. With S = ∅ we obtain Q∈Q(S)∩Q(N \(S∪i))∩Q(i) v Q = 0 (as Q(S) = ∅).
Moreover, not all PS games are clique games, as the next example shows:
Example 4 (Example 3.12 in Kar et al. (2009) for all i and S. However, it is not a clique game. To see this, notice that v(S) = 0 if |S| = 1 imposes that v i = 0 for all i ∈ N . Then, v(S) = 1 if |S| = 2 imposes that any pair i, j belong to some clique Q with v Q = 1. The no-cycle condition of clique games (condition i)) leaves us with a single candidate for the set of cliques: Q = {N }. But then v(S) = |S| − 1 for all S, which is different from the PS-game for |S| = 3.
Minimum cost spanning tree problems
In this section we describe the minimum cost spanning tree problem, showing that an important subset of such games are also clique games. In turn, this allows us to link the nucleolus to some well-known cost sharing solutions for mcst problems.
The problem
We assume that the agents in N need to be connected to a source, denoted by 0. Let N 0 = N ∪ {0}. the set of all cost vectors. Since c assigns cost to all edges e, we often abuse language and call c a cost matrix. A minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problem is a triple (0, N, c). Since 0 and N do not change, we omit them in the following and simply identify a mcst problem (0, N, c) by its cost matrix c.
A cycle p ll is a set of K ≥ 3 edges (i k−1 , i k ), with k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and such that i 0 = i K = l and i 1 , . . . , i K−1 distinct and different than l. A path p lm between l and m is a set of K edges (i k−1 , i k ), with k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, containing no cycle and such that i 0 = l and i K = m. Let P lm (N 0 ) be the set of all such paths between nodes l and m.
A spanning tree is a non-orientated graph without cycles that connects all elements of N 0 . A spanning tree t is identified by the set of its edges.
We call mcst a spanning tree that has a minimal cost. Note that the mcst might not be unique. Let C(N, c) be the minimal cost of a mcst. Let c S be the restriction of the cost matrix c to S 0 ⊆ N 0 . Let C(S, c) be the cost of the mcst of the problem (S, c S ). Given these definitions, we say that C is the stand-alone cost function associated with c. For any cost matrix c, the associated cost game is given by (N, C) with C(S) = C(S, c) for all S ⊆ N . We then write, with some abuse of notation, (N, c) instead of (N, C) and say that it is a mcst game.
A variant of the mcst problem, called the public mcst problem, allows any coalition to use all nodes, including those belonging to agents outside of the coalition, to connect to the source. The public cost function associated with c is defined as
for all S ⊆ N . By contrast, we sometimes call (N, c) the private cost function associated with c and the mcst problem the private mcst problem.
Abusing language slightly, we use the term mcst game to designate the cost game generated by a mcst problem.
The irreducible and cycle-complete cost matrices
Given that a mcst game is typically not a concave game, its Shapley value is not always in the core. The following two modifications to the problem allow to transform the game into a concave one.
From any cost matrix c, we define the irreducible cost matrix c * as follows:
for all i, j ∈ N 0 . From any cost matrix c, we define the cycle-complete cost matrix c * * as follows:
for all i, j ∈ N 0 , and c * *
for all i ∈ N , where c N \{k} * indicates the matrix that we first restrict to agents in N \ {k} before transforming into an irreducible matrix. The cycle complete matrix can also be defined using cycles (Trudeau, 2012) : for edge (i, j), we look at cycles that go through agents i and j. If there is one such cycle such that its most expensive edge is cheaper than a direct connection on edge (i, j), we assign this cost to edge (i, j).
Let C * be the characteristic cost function associated with the mcst problem (N, c * ). Let C * * be the characteristic cost function associated with the mcst problem (N, c * * ). The Shapley values of C * and C * * are respectively called the folk (y f (c)) and cycle-complete (y cc (c)) solutions.
Minimum cost spanning tree games and clique games
We are now ready to describe the set of mcst games that are also clique games.
Lemma 2 Proof. Note first that condition b) can be replaced by: b') c ij = max {c 0i , c 0j } for all i, j ∈ N such that there exists no Q ∈ Q with i, j ∈ Q.
To see why, notice that an edge (i, j) with c ij > max {c 0i , c 0j } is irrelevant in the sense that it does not affect the cost function C. Hence, the associated game (N, v C ) does not change if we reduce c ij until equality holds. We then assume that c has no irrelevant edges. This also forces to have c Q ≤ max {c 0i , c 0j } for all Q ∈ Q and all i, j ∈ Q. We first show that the conditions generate a clique game. Suppose that we want to connect members of S to the source. Conditions a) and b') make it never optimal to directly connect members of different cliques. Combination of the three conditions make it always better to connect members of the same clique to each other. Let {S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S K } be a partition of S such that if i, j ∈ S k , then there exists a path between i and j for which the most expensive edge is c Q , for some Q ∈ Q. Then, the cost of coalition S is
By condition c), if members of a clique have different costs to connect to the source, then all but one have the same high cost c max 0,Q . We can thus simplify the cost of coalition S to
We then have that v C is such that
which corresponds to a clique game with v i = 0 for all i ∈ N and v Q = c max 0,Q − c Q . We next show that these conditions are necessary. Without condition a), there exist i, j, k ∈ Q such that c ij = c Q but c ik = c Q . Then, C({i, j} , c) = min{c 0i , c 0j } + c ij , C({i, k} , c) = min{c 0i , c 0k } + c Q and C is no longer a clique game.
Without condition b), there exist i, j belonging to different cliques such that c ij < max {c 0i , c 0j }. Then C({i, j} , c) = min {c 0i , c 0j } + c ij and C is no longer a clique game.
Without condition c), there exists a clique Q containing m ≥ 3 agents and such that |arg max j∈Q c 0j | < m − 1. There are thus at least two agents, say i and j, with c Consider the subset of mcst problems known as elementary mcst (emcst) problems: for any i, j ∈ N 0 , c ij ∈ {0, 1}. Let Γ e be the set of elementary cost problems. It turns out that the intersection of clique and elementary mcst problems is the set of elementary cycle-complete problems, Lemma 3 Γ c ∩ Γ e = Γ ecc , the set of elementary cycle-complete problems.
Proof. "⊇" We need to show that elementary and cycle-complete mcst games are clique games. By definition, there exists a cover Q of N that satisfies condition i) of clique games and such that c ij = 0 if i, j ∈ Q and c ij = 1 otherwise. Thus, c Q = 0 for all Q ∈ Q and conditions a) and b) of Lemma 2 are satisfied. Elementary cycle-complete matrices are such that for each Q ∈ Q, either all members of Q have a cost of zero to connect to the source, all members of Q have a cost of one to the source, or a single agent in Q has a cost of zero, with others having a cost of one to connect to the source. Otherwise, if agents i and j have a cost of zero, but not k, there are multiple paths of cost zero between the source and k. From this, condition c) of Lemma 2 only applies when a single agent in Q has a cost of zero, with others having a cost of one to connect to the source, so that |arg max j∈Q c 0j | = |{j ∈ Q : c j0 = 1}| = |Q| − 1. "⊆" Let c ∈ Γ c ∩ Γ e . Assume c is not cycle-complete. Then, for some i, j ∈ N 0 , we have that c ij = 1 but there exist two distinct free paths between them. If i, j ∈ N , we cannot build Q that satisfies condition i) of clique games and conditions a) and b) in Lemma 2. If j = 0, we can assume that each node k in these paths but two (one in each path) satisfy c k0 = 1. Let i 0 and i 1 be the nodes with c i 0 0 = c i 1 0 = 0. We also assume that c αβ = 0 for all α, β ∈ N in the path (otherwise, we would be in the previous case). We have the following possibilities:
1. Both paths are contained in the same clique Q ∈ Q. Then, condition c) in Lemma 2 implies |arg max j∈Q c 0j | = |Q| − 1 and hence all nodes in Q but one should have cost 1 to the source. But there are two nodes (i 0 and i 1 ) with cost zero to the source, which is a contradiction.
2. There exist two consecutive nodes α, β ∈ N that belong to different cliques. Since c αβ = 0 and max{c α0 , c β0 } = 1, condition b) in Lemma 2 does not hold, which is a contradiction.
3. There exists a path of at least two cliques between i 0 and i 1 . Clearly, each of these cliques should have at least two consecutive nodes. Moreover, condition i) of clique games implies that i 0 and i 1 belong to different cliques. Thus, there exist j 0 ∈ N consecutive node to i 0 and such
We then have that, in any mcst problem whose cost matrix is elementary and cycle complete, the (pre)nucleolus, the Shapley value, the permutationweighted average of the extreme points of the core and the cycle-complete rule coincide. Formally:
Proof. The correspondence between the nucleolus, the Shapley value and the permutation-weighted average of the extreme points of the core is obtained as a corollary of Theorem 1 and Lemma 3. Correspondence with the cyclecomplete solution is by definition. In addition, as soon as the cost matrix is elementary, the (pre)nucleolus, the permutation-weighted average of the extreme points of the core, and the cycle-complete rule coincide. Formally:
Proof. Correspondence between the cycle-complete solution andȳ is shown in Trudeau and Vidal-Puga (2017) . We show the correspondence between the nucleolus and the cycle-complete solution. It is immediate that C * * ≤ C.
We show that if C * * (S) < C(S), then the excess of coalition S is ignored in the calculation of N u(C * * ).
As shown in Trudeau and Vidal-Puga (2017) , there exists T ⊆ N \ S such that C * * (S) = C(S ∪ T ) + C(N \ T ) − C(N ) < C(S). This can we rewritten
e(S ∪ T, x, v C ) + e(N \ T, x, v C ) − e(N, x, v C ) < e(S, x, v C ) e(S ∪ T, x, v C ) + e(N \ T, x, v C ) < e(S, x, v C ).
Therefore, the excess of S is not taken into account when we find N u(C).
We also have that and thus that the excess of S is not taken into account when we find N u(C * * ).
Therefore, N u(C) and N u(C * * ) depend on the same excesses, and we must have that N u(C) = N u(C * * ). Since N u(C * * ) = y cc (c), we also have that N u(C) = y cc (c).
If we look at public mcst games instead of private mcst games, we obtain similar correspondence results. First, we consider the subset of elementary irreducible games, for which C P ub = C. We have correspondence between the (pre)nucleolus, the Shapley value, the permutation-weighted average of the extreme points of the core and the folk solution. For elementary mcst games, for which C P ub is typically different from C, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 4 For all c ∈ Γ e , N u C P ub =ȳ C P ub = y f (c).
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 and is omitted. The results of this section are summarized in Figure 5 . The set of cliquemcst games are those described in Subsection 5.2.
